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A Third-way for Applying U.S. Labor Laws to the 
Online Gig Economy: Using the Franchise Business 
Model to Regulate Gig Workers 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1930’s, the music industry first coined the term “gig” to refer to “an 
engagement to play at a party for one evening.”1  Eventually, the word’s meaning 
evolved to include any kind of temporary work engagement.2   
The current discussion about the “gig economy,” “gig work or jobs,” or “gig 
companies” refers to a job subset in which entrepreneurs obtain work through an 
internet-based platform that matches them to consumers seeking their services.3  In 
today’s economy, there are countless gig companies that provide a wide range of 
services including: transportation, home-repair, cleaning, food delivery, laundry, 
and others.  A recent survey has shown that “more than 90 million Americans, 44 
percent of all US adults, have either offered their services through online brokers or 
been a customer of someone who has.”4 
 
© 2017 Jaclyn Kurin 
  J.D. 2016, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. Special thanks to NetChoice’s 
Executive Director Steve DelBianco and Senior Policy Counsel Carl Szabo for their advice and insight. 
 1.  Gig, PARTRIDGE’S CONCISE DICTIONARY OF SLANG & UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH 183 (Paul Beale ed., 
1989). 
 2.  See SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, THE BROOKINGS INST., A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR 
LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 6 (2015); JOSEPH V. KENNEDY, INFO. 
TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THREE PATHS TO UPDATE LABOR LAW FOR THE GIG ECONOMY 3 (2016). 
 3.  See generally Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues Arising 
from A Set of “On-Demand/gig Economy” Platforms, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653 (2016) (discussing the new 
issues that are presented by the unique business model of the “gig economy” and “gig workers”). Aloisi 
explains: 
Uber – the world’s most renowned car-hailing company – is undermining traditional taxi 
companies and UpWork – a global freelancing platform
 
– is providing clerical or high-skill 
activities. These [new social] tools have the potential to “chop up” a broad array of jobs into several 
detached tasks that can be allocated to “on-demand” workers, just when they are needed. 
Id. at 655 (internal ciations omitted).  
 4.  Monitor’s Editorial Board, The ‘Gig Economy,’ CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2016/0108/The-gig-economy; Katy Steinmetz, 
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In June 2016, the Department of Commerce published a report about the 
current internet service-transaction economy5 and defined “gig” workers as 
individuals who use “digital matching firms” to obtain jobs.6 According to the 
Department of Commerce, these digital matching firms exhibit four characteristics: 
 
1. They use information technology (IT systems), typically 
available via web-based platforms, such as mobile “apps” on 
internet- enabled devices, to facilitate peer-to-peer 
transactions. 
2. They rely on user-based rating systems for quality control, 
ensuring a level of trust between consumers and service 
providers who have not previously met. 
3. They offer the workers who provide services via digital 
matching platforms flexibility in deciding their typical working 
hours. 
4. To the extent that tools and assets are necessary to provide a 
service, digital matching firms rely on the workers using their 
own.7   
 
Over the past few years, gig companies have pervaded headlines.8   Many have 
lauded these companies for creating more opportunities for those seeking work and 
 
Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-
economy-poll.  
 5.  ESA, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ESA ISSUE BRIEF NO. 01-16, DIGITAL MATCHING FIRMS: A NEW 
DEFINITION IN THE “SHARING ECONOMY” SPACE (2016) [hereinafter ESA, DIGITAL MATCHING FIRMS] 
(“Increasingly, consumers and independent service providers are engaging in transactions facilitated by an 
Internet-based platform.  The digital firms that provide the platforms are often collectively referred to as 
belonging to the ‘sharing’ or ‘collaborative’ economies, among other descriptors.”). 
 6.  Id.; see also Eric Morath, A Tricky Task: Government Tries to Define the Gig Economy, WALL ST. J. (June 
27, 2016 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/06/27/a-tricky-task-government-tries-to-define-the-
gig-economy (explaining that the definition does not include apps or websites from “several types of companies 
that are often associated with the sharing or digital economy, such as eBay and Etsy, which are viewed as mostly 
online retailers. It also cuts out bike-sharing and some types of car-sharing services, such as ZipCar, which are 
essentially rental firms and not peer-to-peer operators.”). 
 7.  ESA, DIGITAL MATCHING FIRMS, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 8.  See, e.g., Robert Ratton III, Do the Hustle: Gig Economy’s Side Hustle Goes Mainstream, JDSUPRA.COM 
(Jan. 27, 2017) (“When the term ‘gig economy’ was coined in 2009, it described the workplace of the 
sometimes-unfortunate souls forced outside of the traditional workforce . . . . By 2015, roughly 54 million 
Americans, one out of every three members of the workforce, have entered to some degree into 
the gig economy . . . . Not only has the gig economy appeared in the halls of legislature, but more traditional 
businesses are incorporating gig economy concepts into their business models.”). 
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supplemental income.9  In addition, many workers believe that their affiliation with 
a gig company has drastically improved the rate in which they can find customers.10 
This, in turn, has allowed these gig workers to focus their efforts on providing the 
specific revenue generating services they specialize in rather than on marketing and 
advertising.11  Moreover, workers have also appreciated the work schedule flexibility 
that many of these companies provide.12   
Sentiment toward these gig companies has not been entirely positive, however.  
Critics claim that many of these companies have structured their businesses in ways 
that subvert labor laws designed to protect employees.13 These critics argue that 
 
 
9.
  
The On-Demand Economy Survey, PRESS RELEASE (Burson Marsteller), Jan. 6, 2016 [hereinafter Burson 
Marsteller, The On-Demand Economy], http://www.burson-marsteller.com/what-we-do/our-thinking/on-
demand/ondemand/press-release.  The release notes that, “71 percent of [gig workers] . . . say working in the 
industry has been a positive experience; their main motivations include extra income (33 percent), a need for 
additional income (26 percent), flexibility (25 percent) and independence (25 percent).” Id. (emphasis added). 
Additionally, a national survey has suggested that the majority of gig workers and employers are satisfied with 
gig companies: 
Sixty-two percent of all employers believe that the On-Demand Economy is a completely different 
way of doing business and 52 percent say the On-Demand Economy is creating more opportunities 
for workers by bringing more wage-earning opportunities to more people.  Similarly, according to 
the earlier On Demand Economy Survey, sixty-two percent of On-Demand Economy workers say it 
is a completely different way of doing business and 57 percent say it is creating more opportunities 
for workers by bringing more wage-earning opportunities to more people. 
Workforce of the Future Survey, PRESS RELEASE (Burson Marsteller), June 30, 2016, http://www.burson-
marsteller.com/what-we-do/the-future-workforce-survey/press-release. 
 10.  Monitor’s Editorial Board, supra note 4; Burson Marsteller, The On-Demand Economy, supra note 9 
(indicating that 51 percent of those who offer On-Demand Economy services say, “their financial situation has 
improved over the past year, compared to 34 percent of the general population; 64 percent of offerors also 
expect their financial situations to improve in the next year, compared to 47 percent of the general 
population”). 
 11.  See John Utz, What is a Gig? Benefits for Unexpected Employees, 62 PRAC. LAW. 19, 20–22 (2016) 
(noting that because “gig workers do not need to invest in establishing a company and marketing to a consumer 
base, operating costs may be lower and allow workers’ participation to be more transitory in the gig market (i.e., 
they have greater flexibility around the number of hours worked and scheduling.)”). 
 12.  See BURSON MARSTELLER, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE & TIME, THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY SURVEY: 
MOTIVATED VS. CASUAL WORKERS INFOGRAPHIC (2016), http://burson-marsteller.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/06151052/Motivated-v-Casual-Workers-Infographic-V3.pdf (reporting that 78 
percent of infrequent or “casual workers” do not rely on gig work as their primary source of income, deriving 
less than “20% of their personal income from the [gig] economy”). The report also demonstrates that only 
thirty-two percent of gig workers rely on gig work as their primary source of income, deriving more than “40% 
of their personal income” from gig jobs. Id. 
 13.  See Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern Gig-
Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 341, 343 (2016) (“In response to various suits brought by Uber 
drivers challenging their independent contractor status . . . . Uber argued [that] it was not a transportation 
company at all, but rather a ‘neutral technological platform designed simply to enable drivers and passengers to 
transact the business of transportation.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
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commission-based14 gig companies turn profits by avoiding traditional operating 
costs such as the payment of employee benefits.15   
Although some gig companies voluntarily provide the employee benefits 
mandated by law,16 other gig companies maintain that they are exempt from doing 
so by virtue of their licensing agreements and believe their workers are merely 
independent contractors.17   
Despite some inconsistency across jurisdictions, courts and agencies have largely 
found that at least some form of business relationship exists between the gig 
company and the worker.18  The discrepancy, however, largely stems from differing 
tests and standards applied to determine whether a worker is an independent 
contractor or an employee of the gig company under law.19 
Scholars have offered several approaches as to how to address this issue: (1) 
create a new worker classification,20 (2) develop a new legal test for determining 
employee status,21 and (3) broaden the coverage of labor statutes to include all 
workers.22  This Article breaks from recent proposals that call for a change in the 
existing law and, instead, proposes a different solution that balances the interests of 
gig companies, entrepreneurs, and consumers within the existing legal framework 
and gig market. 
Specifically, gig companies should adopt a franchise business model.  In doing 
so, these companies would be able to shield themselves from the liability incurred 
 
 14.  ESA, DIGITAL MATCHING FIRMS, supra note 5, at 2. 
 15.  Monitor’s Editorial Board, supra note 4; KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 10; HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 
2, at 5, 27. 
 16.  See Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Workforce Relationships in the Sharing Economy, 20 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 10 (2016) (“[P]latforms often substitute themselves for government safeguards meant to protect 
public goods like safety, non-discrimination, and fair labor practices. Uber, for instance, vets aspiring drivers . . . 
.”). 
 17.  Id. at 355 (explaining that “employers have used various tactics to label workers as independent, for 
example by manipulating subtle semantic distinctions, exploiting subcontracting structures, or registering 
workers as independent business entities”). 
 18.  See id. at 347, 352 (“No single factor is dispositive.  Courts evaluate each of the ten factors with an eye 
towards determining which party generally has control over the work process . . . .”). 
 19.  See id. at 348, 352. 
 20.  KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 10 (proposing the creation of a third category of workers); HARRIS & 
KRUEGER, supra note 2, at 5, 27 (proposing “a new legal category of workers . . . call[ed] ‘independent workers,’” 
who qualify for coverage of some labor laws, such as “Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes, but not others, 
such as time-and-a-half for overtime hours”). 
 21.  KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 10–11, 19; HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 2, at 7 (“Existing law wrongly 
implies that employees and independent contractors occupy the entire field of work relationships in the U.S. 
economy. This dichotomy is a vestige of the early law of ‘masters’ and ‘servants’ that is as archaic as the words 
suggest.”). 
 22.  KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 10–11, 19 (noting that “[c]ontinued reliance on [the common-law] 
definition” of an employer-employee relationship “discourages gig-platform companies from offering more 
assistance to workers who use the platform”).  
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by franchisees.  Moreover, gig companies as franchisors would be able to maintain 
the necessary control over their brand without having to provide the same 
compensatory benefits to franchisees as they otherwise would for employees.   
This Article has five parts.  Part I explains how gig companies function as digital 
matching firms to facilitate transactions between gig workers and consumers.23  Part 
II summarizes the historical and legal frameworks and policy considerations 
surrounding worker classifications.24 Next, Part III provides an explanation of the 
franchise business model.25  Here, the author demonstrates how the franchise 
relationship fits within the existing legal framework and employee status 
determinations.26  Following, Part IV summarizes recent legal authority which has 
maintained that gig companies are not exempt from providing employee benefits.27  
Lastly, Part V explains how employing the franchise business model may better 
serve gig companies moving forward.28   
I.  THE ROLE OF GIG COMPANIES AS MATCHER IN A TWO-SIDED 
MARKET 
In 2012, Professor Alvin E. Roth won the Nobel Prize in economics for illustrating 
that the conditions for successful market transactions are based on the principles of 
market design and matching.29  In his scholarship, Professor Roth maintained that a 
“marketplace” brings together participants willing to transact.30   
According to Roth, marketplaces work best when the market is “thicker and 
quicker, bigger and less congested.”31  A thicker market means that there are many 
participants who wish to transact.32  Congestion occurs when participants are 
overwhelmed with options.33  To overcome congestion, participants need a way to 
quickly identify the most promising offers within the marketplace.34  
“Matching” describes the application and selection process that marketplace 
participants use for completing a transaction.35  Roth explains that an “offer isn’t 
 
 23.  See infra Part I. 
 24.  See infra Part II. 
 25.  See infra Part III. 
 26.  See infra Part III. 
 27.  See infra Part IV. 
 28.  See infra Part V. 
 29.  Alvin E. Roth – Facts, NOBEL MEDIA AB 2014, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2012/roth-facts.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 30.  ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT AND WHY 8 (2015). 
 31.  Id. at 104. 
 32.  Id. at 9. 
 33.  Id. at 8. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 4. 
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just a set of terms, it’s a proposal of a match to a particular counterpart.”36  As such, 
the matching process can be ad hoc or structured by design.37  Matching businesses 
thrive by designing a matching environment that ensures transactions are “safe and 
simple” and that enables participants to quickly differentiate competing offers.38   
Many of today’s gig companies are digital matching firms that facilitate 
transactions between entrepreneurs and consumers.  Roth explains that these 
companies owe their success to their ability to design a matching environment that 
is superior to alternatives.39  
For example, transportation based gig companies match drivers with riders.  The 
drivers are entrepreneurs who sell the vacant passenger seats in their vehicles while 
the riders are the consumers seeking to buy those seats and ride to a specific 
destination.  Roth explains that “[i]f making a match . . . [was] too frustrating, 
[then consumers] would go back to using taxis.”40  
II: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
CATEGORIES: EMPLOYEE VS. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
A.  The Changing U.S. Labor Market Has Historically Informed Notions of Employee 
Status and Benefit Coverage  
The current employment relationship, consisting of extensive employer-provided 
benefits, is a relatively recent development in the history of our labor market and 
was the product of a long list of historical, political, technological, and market 
factors.41   
According to American economic historian, Professor Sanford M. Jacoby, these 
factors specifically manifested themselves in:  
changes in technology and the composition of the workforce; new social 
norms associated with the labor movement and with the public’s response to 
the Great Depression; the expansion of government’s role in the economy; 
 
 36.  ROTH, supra note 30, at 111. 
 37.  Id. at 6. 
 38.  Id. at 11, 51–52. 
 39.  Id. at 102–04. 
 40.  Id. at 105. 
 41.  See SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Anne C. Duffy ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., rev. ed. 2004), 
http://www.untag-smd.ac.id/files/Perpustakaan_Digital_1/BUREAUCRACY%20Employing 
%20bureaucracy%20%20managers,%20unions,%20and%20the%20transformation%20of%20work%20in%20t
he%20twenti.pdf (discussing the progression of the employment system from the late nineteenth century to 
present day). The new employment relationship is exemplified as an employer providing a range of 
employment benefits that “sustain jobs during good times and bad; provide health, old-age, and other benefits; 
and avoid[ing] wage cuts as a response to business fluctuations.” Id. at 217. 
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the managerialization of corporate governance; the professionalization of 
management; and employee training and other efficiency-oriented responses 
of employers to more enduring employment relationships.42 
Indeed, such substantial employment benefits and working condition 
protections guaranteed by current employment standards are in stark contrast to 
those provided in the late 1700’s.  In fact, from then up until “the nineteenth 
century[,] the [employment] relationship was predominantly one of status 
described as ‘[principal] and [agent],’ with the legally imposed rules implementing 
a dominant-servient relation.”43  “The relationship of a [principal] to his 
journeymen and apprentices was governed by the law of [principal] and [agent] . . . 
that grew out of the status of the worker as, in effect, a member of the [principal’s] 
household.”44  “[I]ndentured servants and, later, bound apprentices signified their 
displeasure [with the relationship] by running away.”45  Through this relationship 
the journeyman mastered a craft, and “his ability to sell his skills elsewhere.”46   
With the growth of the post-Civil War industrial economy, came a time of 
repugnant employment practices.  Employers paid such low wages that most 
families, including children, had to work and endure hazardous working 
conditions.47  To make matters worse, many businesses delegated employment 
decisions to foremen who would make hiring and wage related decisions based on 
arbitrary factors, personal ties, and racial prejudices.48  Employers enforced a drive 
 
 42.  Id. at 217–18. 
 43.  MATTHEW W. FINKIN, ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 1 (3d ed. 2002). 
 44.  Id. at 3–4. 
 45.  Id. at 4. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. at 7–8. Some have characterized factory life as exemplifying “employer’s plenary exercise of 
prerogative unilaterally to make and enforce rules.” Id. at 7. Employers instituted “rules . . . to ‘enhance control’ 
of the working force: specification of the working time, fines for absences and tardiness, prohibitions on leaving 
the premise or engaging in casual conversations, and forfeiture of wages for quitting without notice were 
common.” Id.  In the early 1900s, the “employer[’s] control over employees’ working (and non-working) lives 
in some industries could be and was far-reaching.” Id. at 8. This working environment of pervasive employer 
control was not the exception but instead was common in several industries. For example, a “Southern cotton 
textile manufacture developed” out of a “mill town-wholly owned by a company [that] insisted on employing 
entire families . . . .”  Id.  These company towns exerted near-total control over the residents who lived within 
them.  See id. (describing these oppressive controls over employees as including, “wage structure[s] for male 
and female operators and children” so as to “require the entire family to work, and the [practice of] dismissal of 
all for the misconduct of one” of the employees). Similarly, employers “provided housing, schooling, churches, 
and engaged in a certain amount of ‘welfare’ work, even to efforts at regulating private life, recreation, and 
religion.”  Id.   
 48.  See JACOBY, supra note 41, at 13–18. Jacoby recounts how from 1880 to 1915, foremen, across all 
industries, exercised near unanimous control over employment matters and were “given free rein in hiring, 
paying, and supervising workers.” Id. at 13.   
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system and implemented various wage incentive plans, such as those based on 
piece-rates, in a conscious effort to pay as few employee benefits as possible.49   
In response to these conditions, trade workers formed unions to increase their 
bargaining power and curb arbitrary hiring practices, increase wages, and improve 
working conditions.50  Through collective action, these new unions provided more 
power to the individual workers whose labor strikes were a powerful motivation 
behind labor reforms.51   
Then, during World War I, the federal government, which had previously taken 
a laissez-faire approach to employment practices, began to intervene in an effort to 
prevent work stoppages that deterred wartime production demands.52  Many liberal 
labor reforms did not last much past the war era, however.53 
Following, during the Great Depression, the economy and work force faced 
massive layoffs and unemployment coupled with low employee turnover.54  Since 
most employers had not provided employees with any unemployment benefits, 
many state unemployment funds went broke trying to provide welfare benefits to 
 
 49.  See JACOBY, supra note 41, at 33–42. “The first incentive wage schemes used in American industry were 
piece-rate wages, which became increasingly popular after 1880.”  Id. at 33. Employers had used different piece-
rate systems to avoid paying employees and motivate workers to get maximum productivity. “[P]iece rates were 
not a price paid for the product of their work but simply one way of paying of their labor power while 
increasing their output.” DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, 
AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925 152 (1987). “Failure to produce at a high level brought direct and 
instant punishment: loss of pay.”  FINKIN, ET AL., supra note 43, at 8–9.  This type of task system thrived in 
industries where the final product was the result of group work. “[E]very worker [had] a stake in the output of 
the group” because one worker failing to complete his task prevented the ultimate production of the good and 
led to the loss of pay for other workers.  Id. at 9.   
 50.  See JACOBY, supra note 41, at 18–23. One method unions used to curb arbitrary hiring practices was 
the implementation of closed or preferential shops which “restricted the foreman’s discretion to hire whomever 
he chose and enhanced demand for union labor.” Id. at 19. Unions were also a powerful force in increasing 
wages by demanding businesses create a standard rate which all union members were supposed to receive. Id. at 
19. With respect to working conditions, unions regulated working hours and imposed specified production 
output limits. Id. at 21. 
 51.  See id. at 33–34, 40, 89–91.  Jacoby states that “the most famous of these new wage incentive plans was 
Frederick W. Taylor’s differential piece[-]rate, which . . . set [the minimum rate] ‘scientifically’ by breaking a 
task down into its component parts, timing these parts, eliminating ‘unnecessary motions,’ and then arriving at 
a minimum time for task completion.”  Id. at 33.  Consequently, when employers began to introduce such 
wage-incentive plans, unionized trades turned to striking because they feared the plans would cheapen labor 
through breaking down tasks into simpler jobs and could eradicate collective bargaining by “ultimately turning 
the wage bargain into an individual matter between the worker and his employer.”  Id. at 34.   
 52.  See id. at 104–06, 112–13.   
 53.  See id. at 128–34, 154–66. Jacoby states that “[m]ost of the problems that had justified employment 
reform during the war period were gone: The union threat had receded, productivity was high, turnover was 
low, and labor was easily available.” Id. at 129.   
 54.  See id. at 154–56.   
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millions of unemployed workers.55  Out of desperation, many adult employees 
agreed to be paid lower wages and work longer hours.56  Even when an entire family 
worked, many families were still unable to afford basic life necessities.57   
In an effort to increase purchasing power and reduce unemployment, the federal 
government passed the Fair Labor Standards Act setting minimum wage and 
maximum hour standards,58 and enacted other legislation to increase employment 
stabilization by shifting the burden of unemployment benefits onto private 
employers.59 
During World War II, the government continued to exercise extensive control 
over the labor market.  Much like World War I, the government sought to deter 
wartime strikes and supported collective bargaining rights by “compel[ling] 
employers to negotiate with and grant membership security to the unions.”60  
Additionally, the government established agencies that made decisions “affecting 
pay and labor allocations between firms.”61  Over time, workers began to establish 
themselves in their communities, and by the 1950’s, inequality levels had 
decreased.62   
But, this prosperity was short-lived.  By the 1970’s “there was a growing concern 
over worker dissatisfaction . . . , [c]ompanies faced increased opportunities and 
incentives to open nonunion facilities. . . . [and] [g]overnment regulation of the 
workplace proliferated along various dimensions.”63   
Simultaneously, many large corporations restructured their personnel practices 
to ensure compliance with remedial government legislation prohibiting certain 
forms of discriminatory practices in employment.64  To avoid “the risk of lawsuits 
 
 55.  See id. at 154 (“Local governments struggled with varying degrees of success to fill the gap, but most 
municipal relief programs were bankrupt by fall of 1931.”).   
 56.  See, e.g., Letter from R.H.O., to President Franklin Roosevelt (Mar. 4, 1937), in SLAVES OF THE 
DEPRESSION: WORKERS’ LETTERS ABOUT LIFE ON THE JOB 76 (1987). 
 57.  See, e.g., Letter From Mrs. L.B., to President Franklin Roosevelt & Eleanor Roosevelt (May 3, 
1937), in SLAVES OF THE DEPRESSION: WORKERS’ LETTERS ABOUT LIFE ON THE JOB, 76–77 (1987). 
 58.  Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206–07 (2012); see JACOBY, supra note 41, at 185.   
 59.  E.g., Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012). See JACOBY, supra note 41, at 176 
(explaining how the federal government promoted employment stabilization by pressuring private employers to 
implement work-sharing programs).   
 60.  JACOBY, supra note 41, at 194.   
 61.  Id.   
 62.  See id. at 207–08 (finding that by the mid-1950s, the benefits reserved for salaried employees had been 
extended to include a majority of blue-collar workers). 
 63.  Id. at 212. 
 64.  Id. at 214. To achieve such remedial reforms, Congress passed several federal statutes during that 
period. Id. Jacoby states that “[s]tarting with the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, the 
[F]ederal [G]overnment kept up a steady pace of regulatory innovation the likes of which had not been seen 
since the 1930s: the Equal Pay Act (1963), Civil Rights Act (1964), Economic Opportunity Act (1964), 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970), Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Act (1972), 
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and other negative publicity” from non-compliance with [Equal Employment 
Opportunity] and occupational safety laws,” employers “centralized” their 
personnel practices for “hiring, firing, disciplining, directing, training, promoting 
and compensating subordinates.”65  Departing from a regime where foremen 
oversaw nearly all hiring and management practices, corporate governance 
structures began to change and CEOs and presidents became more involved in 
employment related decisions.66 
Since the 1980’s, union membership has declined while the service-based 
industry has expanded.67  Jacoby claims that today “most U.S. [businesses] are 
service providers whose success depends less on technological breakthroughs than 
on customer attraction and retention.”68  As a result, many businesses are seeking to 
cultivate customer loyalty by retaining experienced employees who are satisfied 
with their working conditions.69  In doing so, some employers have shifted certain 
compensation risks back to employees.70  They have done so by altering guaranteed 
benefit plans and offering performance-based pay options in their place.71 
While there is certainly some contention over the interpretation of the data, 
several analysts have argued that the labor market is undergoing a significant 
change once again.72 One characteristic of this change is the growth in the number 
of nonstandard jobs—those entailing various forms of self-employment, 
contractual, temporary and part-time work.73  While there are various contributing 
factors, one reason for this growth is undoubtedly the rise of the gig economy. 
 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (1973), and various executive orders, including one that 
established the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.” Id.   
 65.  Id.  
 66.  See JACOBY, supra note 41, at 33–34, 204, 214.   
 67.  See Bradley Nash, Jr., Labor Law and the State: The Crises of Unions in the 1980s (Apr. 19, 2000) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute) (on file with the University Libraries, Virginia 
Tech). 
 68.  JACOBY, supra note 41, at 221. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 220. 
 71.  See id. Jacoby explains that employers universally have shifted some of their risks on to employees by 
changing the types of benefit plans they offer, such as “managed-care health plans and larger deductibles for 
health insurance,” and going from offering “defined-benefit pension plans to defined contribution pension 
plans.” Id. But at the same time, employers compete for workers by offering “more variability into pay packages 
via discretionary bonuses, group incentives, profit sharing, stock options, and other forms of performance-
based pay.” Id. 
 72.  JACOBY, supra note 41, at 218. 
 73.  Id. at 219. 
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B.  Policy Considerations Influencing Employee Status Determinations 
Today, workers generally fall within one of two legal classifications: employees or 
independent contractors.  These classifications were founded upon the agency 
principles highlighted below. 
The agency doctrine maintains that the principal should be liable when he exerts 
a degree of control over the manner and means of the agent’s work that causes 
damage to a third-party.74  Public policy justifies holding the employer liable in 
certain situations, based on “deliberate allocation of a risk” principles.75  The 
underlying objective of this policy is that the employer/principal be held responsible 
for the “losses caused by the torts of employee, which as a practical matter 
[occurred] in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise” as a cost of doing business.76   
The distinct autonomy an independent contractor exercises in pursuing their 
enterprise does not warrant the same policy considerations.  Put another way, 
because “the employer has no right of control over [how the work is done], it is . . . 
the contractor’s own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the proper 
party to be charged with responsibility for preventing the risk, and administering 
and distributing it.”77   
Nevertheless, doctrines of apparent authority and non-delegable duties may still 
permit a finding of employer liability for various acts of independent contractors.78 
Although one of the overarching purposes of this policy is to efficiently allocate 
market risk, employment status considerations are also influenced by bargaining 
disparities, antitrust issues, technological advances, and societal interests in 
improving public health.79   
C.  The Law Surrounding Employees and Independent Contractors 
While every company has its own unique goals and requirements, hiring 
independent contractors rather than employees may provide several operational 
and financial advantages.  Firstly, independent contractors may provide temporary 
or specialized expertise for an impermanent job.80  This allows companies to 
provide more expansive services without necessarily having to hire additional 
 
 74.  See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (W. Page Keeton et. al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. § 71. 
 78.  Mark Macmurdo, Hold the Phone! “Peer-to-Peer” Ridesharing Services, Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. 
L. REV. 307, 337–39 (2015). 
 79.  See JOHN R. COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 25–36 (1918). 
 80.  Todd H. Lebowitz, Independent Contractor Misclassification, 2015 LEGAL ANALYSIS (BAKER HOSTETLER, 
Cleveland, OH), Oct. 16, 2015, at 6.  
KURIN PP v4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2017  4:28 PM 
 A Third Way for Applying U.S. Labor Laws to the Online Gig Economy 
204 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
employees for a season and then laying them off once the job is finished.81  
Furthermore, many labor statutes that guarantee employment benefits and 
protections for employees do not apply to independent contractors.82   
Determining whether a worker is covered by a statute depends on the statute in 
question and the test the court or agency uses to determine worker classification.83  
Nearly every state has passed its own additional laws on worker’s compensation, 
unemployment coverage, minimum wage requirements, prohibited workplace 
discrimination, and other employment matters.84  Furthermore, even when a state 
statute mirrors a federal statute, state legislatures may choose to forego the federal 
definition of a covered worker in place of a more expansive definition that broadens 
coverage.85 
To complicate matters further, the definition of a covered employee may vary 
from statute to statute within the same state.  For example, a state may use one test 
to determine if a worker is an employee for purposes of unemployment 
compensation, yet that same state may apply a different test to determine if the 
worker is entitled to employee minimum wage and overtime pay.86 
Unless the statute explicitly provides otherwise, however, courts generally default 
to the state’s common law agency test.87  This test generally takes the form of a 
multi-factor inquiry and may vary slightly across jurisdictions.88  Despite this slight 
variation, the universal focus across jurisdictions remains on the employer’s degree 
of control over the worker.89  Examples of some of the factors which courts consider 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 6, 9. 
 83.  Id. at 10. 
 84.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-101; see also MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-903. 
 85.  Richard J. Reibstein et al., Independent Contractor Misclassification: How Companies Can Minimize the 
Risks, 2015 WHITE PAPER (PEPPER HAMILTON, Philadelphia, PA), Apr. 27, 2015, at 1, 4–5. 
 86.  Todd H. Lebowitz, Independent Contractor Misclassification, 2016 LEGAL ANALYSIS (BAKER HOSTETLER, 
Cleveland, OH), Jan. 2016, at 1, 13–14. 
 87.  Id. at 17. 
 88.  Id. at 13–14, 26–27. 
 89.  See Rasier LLC v. Florida, NO. 0026 2834 68-02, 21 n.22 (Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity Dec. 3, 2015) 
(final determination) (applying the FLSA’s economic realities test, the adjudicator concluded that while “the 
Fair Labor Standards Act’s ‘economic reality’ test is different from, and of ‘a broader scope’ than, traditional 
common law” the FLSA factors are “similar to the Restatement factors” in that both seek to determine whether 
“the worker is . . . [an] employee . . . [or really an] independent contractor” based on the economic reliance 
associated with the employer-employee).  Id. The adjudicator based this reasoning on a “Labor Department 
document” which stated that “‘[u]ltimately, the goal [of applying the economic realities test] is . . . to determine 
whether the worker is economically dependent on the employer (and thus its employee) or is really in business 
for him or herself (and thus its independent contractor.)’” Id. (first alteration in the original). See generally 
Sharma v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 57 F. Supp. 3d 36 (D.D.C. 2014); Munoz v. 
Industrial Com’n of Arizona, 234 Ariz. 145, 318 P.3d 439 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). 
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in this inquiry are contained in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220.90  These 
factors include: 
 
1. the extent of control which, by the agreement, the principal 
may exercise over the details of the work;  
2. whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business;  
3. the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision;  
4. the skill required in the particular occupation;  
5. whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work;  
6. the length of time for which the person is employed;  
7. the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;  
8. whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer;  
9. whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation 
of principal and agent; and  
10. whether the principal is or is not in business.91 
D.  Agency Involvement and Presumptions 
State and federal agencies enforce the labor laws promulgated by Congress and state 
legislatures.  These agencies are tasked with interpreting statute and putting forth 
regulations that ensure coverage dispensation.92   
In making employment status determinations, courts and agencies alike presume 
that a statute broadly covers most workers.93  In other words, these entities operate 
 
 90.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). 
 91.  Id. One expert explains the evolution of the right to control test in determining agency status for the 
purpose of tort liability: 
The First Agency Restatement supplemented the right to control test that had been used in the prior 
century to delimit employer vicarious liability for the torts of its employees within the scope of 
employment. These reformulations, including that offered by the Supreme Court in two decisions 
as a default rule for federal employment statutes. Sometimes overlooked is the fact that the Agency 
Restatement supplemented the “right to control” test with ten or more other factors, but had not 
specified why these factors were relevant to the distinction of independent contractor. 
Michael Harper, The Restatement of Employment Law’s “Entrepreneurial Control” Test, NYU LAB. & EMP. L. 
NEWS (NYU Center for Labor and Employment Law, New York, N.Y.), Fall 2015, at 6, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Labor%20Center%20Fall%202015%20Newsletter_0.pdf. 
 92.  See LEBOWITZ (2015), supra note 80, at 7–8. 
KURIN PP v4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2017  4:28 PM 
 A Third Way for Applying U.S. Labor Laws to the Online Gig Economy 
206 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
under the legal presumption that a worker/complainant is an employee within the 
meaning of the statute.94  Under this employee presumptive regime, the employer 
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption by making an affirmative showing 
that the particular worker is not an employee within the meaning of the statute.95  
Agencies and courts use an employee presumption in order to counteract power 
imbalances and information asymmetry.96  Ordinarily, employers must comply with 
certain reporting requirements regarding their employees.97 Since many statutes 
involving employee benefits and taxation are tied to the amount of employees an 
employer has, there are certain incentives for the employer to under-report its 
amount of employees.98  Thus, agencies which cannot afford to monitor each 
business’ operations are at an informational disadvantage that can only be 
overcome if the burden of proof is shifted to the employer.  
E.  The Changing Tide in Interpreting Employee Status 
As discussed above, the Depression was an abysmal period for workers’ rights.99  
Operating within traditional common law agency principles centering around the 
right of control, many employers were able to insulate their businesses from liability 
and statutory compliance by contracting with intermediary companies that 
provided an independent contractor labor force.100   
 
 93.  See Independent Contractor Versus Employee, CA.GOV, http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/FAQ_ 
IndependentContractor.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 3357 (1937)). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-(1)(c) (as amended in 1980); U.S. DEP’T TREAS., I.R.S., EMPLOYER’S 
SUPPL. TAX GUIDE, CAT. NO. 21453T (Dec. 23, 2015) [hereinafter I.R.S. EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE], 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15a.pdf. 
 96.  See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that Uber 
was unable to rebut the presumption that their drivers were employees instead of independent contractors); 
Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (stating that under California law, if someone 
performs a service for a company, the person performing the service is generally presumed to be an employee); 
Hennighan v. Insphere Ins. Sols., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 500 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (deciding that despite the presumption that a person who provides services to the employer is an 
employee, the plaintiff was considered an independent contractor because of the lack of control the employer 
had over the plaintiff).  See generally Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010); Villalpando v. Exel 
Direct Inc., 303 F.R.D. 588, 600 (N.D. Cal. 2014); S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 
P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1989). 
 97.  See I.R.S. EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE, supra note 95, at 7. 
 98.  LEBOWITZ (2015), supra note 80, at 7–8; see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2012) (pertaining to employers who 
have twenty or more employees); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (pertaining to employers with fifteen or more 
employees); 42 U.S.C. § 1211 (2012) (pertaining to employers with fifteen or more employees); 29 U.S.C. § 
2611 (2012) (pertaining to employers with fifty or more employees). 
 99.  See supra Part II. 
 100.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2015-1, The Application 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “Suffer or Permit” Standard in Identification of Employees Who Are 
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Congress passed the FLSA and expanded the definition of an employee in order 
to address this situation.101  The Department of Labor (DOL), which is the agency 
charged with enforcing the FLSA, has also provided its own interpretation of the 
law maintaining that, “[t]he ultimate inquiry under the FLSA is whether the worker 
is economically dependent on the employer or truly in business for him or 
herself.”102   
The DOL determines whether an individual is economically dependent by 
applying factors analyzing the economic reality of the relationship.103  Although the 
proportional weight attributed to the test’s factors varies across circuits, the DOL’s 
2015 interpretation is quite instructive and focuses on:  
(1) the extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the 
employer’s business; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss 
depending on his or her managerial skill; (3) the extent of the relative 
investments of the employer and the worker; (4) whether the work 
performed requires special skills and initiative; (5) the permanency of the 
relationship; and (6) the degree of control exercised or retained by the 
employer.104  
 
Misclassified as Independent Contractors (July 15, 2015), at 3–4. The Administrator’s interpretation explains 
that the FLSA’s definition of employee, which is to “suffer or permit” work was based on state child labor laws: 
Prior to the FLSA’s enactment, the phrase “suffer or permit” (or variations of the phrase) was 
commonly used in state laws regulating child labor and was “designed to reach businesses that used 
middlemen to illegally hire and supervise children.”  A key rationale underlying the “suffer or 
permit” standard in child labor laws was that the employer’s opportunity to detect work being 
performed illegally and the ability to prevent it from occurring was sufficient to impose liability on 
the employer.  Thus, extending coverage of child labor laws to those who suffered or permitted the 
work was designed to expand child labor laws’ coverage beyond those who controlled the child 
laborer, counter an employer’s argument that it was unaware that children were working, and 
prevent employers from using agents to evade requirements. 
Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted).  
 101.  Id. at 1–2. The Administrator’s interpretation explains that Congress intended that the meaning of 
employee under the FLSA would be more comprehensive than the common law, agency definition: 
The FLSA’s definition of employ as “to suffer or permit to work” and the later-developed 
“economic realities” test provide a broader scope of employment than the common law control test. 
Indeed, although the common law control test was the prevalent test for determining whether an 
employment relationship existed at the time that the FLSA was enacted, Congress rejected the 
common law control test in drafting the FLSA.  Instead, the FLSA defines “employ” broadly as 
including “to suffer or permit to work,” which clearly covers more workers as employees. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 102.  Id. at 5. 
 103.  Id. at 5–6. 
 104.  Id. at 4. 
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Even though traditional agency principles are still evident in the economic realities 
test, the slight variations in this test have tended to lead to more frequent findings 
of an employer-employee relationship.105  
The Tenth Circuit introduced the the term “economic realities,” which was later 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb.106  In this case, 
the Supreme Court held that skilled carvers tasked with deboning meat were 
employees under the FLSA because their work was integral to the slaughtering 
plant’s business.107  In Rutherford, the carvers were on the assembly line with the rest 
of the employees.108  Even though they worked for a different company, the 
employer exerted extensive control over the carvers by paying them on a piece-rate 
system, complaining “frequently about their failure to cut all of the meat off the 
bones.”109 Furthermore, the carvers could only work during the hours when the rest 
of the meat packing assembly line operated.110  Thus, the Court found that the 
control exerted was indistinguishable from the control the employer would use over 
an employee who performed the same duty.111 
In Dole v. Snell, the Tenth Circuit found cake decorators were integral to a 
custom cake business because hiring an independent contractor to perform the 
decoration task did not change the work performed.112  Similarly, in Doty v. Elias, 
the Tenth Circuit found restaurant workers were integral to the restaurant’s 
business.113  Ultimately, the crux of these determinations depended upon whether 
the employer used a piece-work system to fulfill duties that were essential to the 
operation of the business.114  As such, the integral to business factor was given more 
relative weight than some of the other factors guiding the employment status 
inquiry.   
More recently, as several decisions regarding the misclassification of FedEx 
delivery drivers illustrate, the determination of employee status depends largely on 
whether employer controls sufficiently prevent the worker from being in business 
 
 105.  Id. at 1–2. 
 106.  See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947). 
 107.  Id. at 729. 
 108.  Id. at 730. 
 109.  Id. at 726–29 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 110.  See generally id. at 725–27. 
 111.  Id. at 730 (“While profits to the boners depended upon the efficiency of their work, it was more like 
piecework than an enterprise that actually depended for success upon the initiative, judgment or foresight of the 
typical independent contractor.”).  
 112.  See 875 F.2d 802, 811 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that cake decorators “[are] obviously integral” to the 
business of selling custom-decorated cakes).  
 113.  733 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1984).  
 114.  See, e.g., Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730–31; United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945); 
Snell, 875 F.2d at 809–11.  
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for himself—i.e. being able to function as an independent contractor or sole 
proprietor.115   
The majority decision in the NLRB’s Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. 
case also illustrates this change in the inquiry.116  In Browning-Ferris the NLRB, 
tasked with conducting the employment status inquiry, found that the Browning 
Ferris company (BFI) was a joint employer of workers that a contractor, Leadpoint 
Business Services, had hired to complete housekeeping and janitorial duties at the 
BFI recycling center.117  Although BFI did not exercise any direct or immediate 
control over those workers, as Leadpoint was responsible for setting the workers’ 
wages and benefits, and BFI never established safety, training, disciplinary and other 
rules for work, the majority nevertheless concluded that BFI operated as a joint 
employer.118   As such, those workers were entitled to collective bargaining rights, 
enabling them to negotiate not just with contractor but also with the BFI corporate 
headquarters.119  As the dissent in Browning Ferris described, the majority 
essentially found that parent companies are legally joint-employers with their 
contractors, staffing agencies, and franchisees.120  
As the NLRB dissent points out, to reach these conclusions, the majority invoked 
an economic realities test that Congress had expressly repudiated by statute.121  The 
majority justified their approach because of bargaining disparities in the market 
place.122  Such a test, the majority reasoned, was within the Board’s power because 
the purpose of the statute was to remedy societal harms.123  However, as the dissent 
explained, the majority’s policy-based rationale behind their inquiry was similarly 
denounced by Congress.124  The dissent stated that “our colleagues have announced 
a new test of joint-employer status based on policy and economic interests that 
Congress has expressly prohibited the Board from considering.”125  
 
 115.  See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2014); Craig v. 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 686 F.3d 423, 426–29 (7th Cir. 2012); Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 
Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2010); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495–96 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 
In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557, 584–88 (N.D. Ind. 2010); Afinson v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys., Inc., 281 P.3d 289, 297–300 (Wash. 2012). 
 116.  See Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 2 (2015) (holding that BFI and 
Leadpoint are considered joint-employers of the employees because: (1) BFI had control over which employees 
Leadpoint could hire and fire; (2) BFI had direct and indirect control over work processes and task assignments; 
and (3) BFI had a significant role in determining employees’ wages).  
 117.  Id. at 20. 
 118.  Id. at 4–6. 
 119.  Id. at 20. 
 120.  Id. at 31 (Miscimarra and Johnson, JJ., dissenting). 
 121.  Id. at 28. 
 122.  Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 1. 
 123.  See id. at 20. 
 124.  Id. at 48 (Miscimarra and Johnson, JJ., dissenting). 
 125.  Id. 
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The dissent further argued that the majority’s motivation for an egalitarian 
market place is not only contrary to our capitalist economy but also impractical to 
implement.126 Ultimately, such a test could effectively erode many business 
relationships.  As the dissent illustrated:  
Under the majority’s test, the homeowner hiring a plumbing company for 
bathroom renovations could well have all of that indirect control over a 
company employee!  We suppose that our colleagues do not intend that 
every business relationship necessarily entails joint employer status, but the 
facts relied upon here demonstrate the expansive, near-limitless nature of 
the majority’s new standard.127 
Additionally, the dissent recognized that the majority’s test for zero scale 
employer involvement “threatens existing franchising arrangements in 
contravention of Board precedent and trademark law requirements.”128  The dissent 
explained that “in many if not most instances, franchisor operational control has 
nothing to do with labor policy but rather compliance with federal statutory 
requirements to maintain trademark protections.”129  The dissent elaborated that 
“even while franchise law requires some degree of oversight and interaction, it was 
never the intent of Congress, by that interaction, to make a franchisee the agent of 
its franchisor for any purpose.”130  The dissent then warned that “the new joint-
employer standard portends unintended consequences for a franchisor’s 
compliance with the requirements of another Federal act that is totally unrelated to 
labor relations.”131 
Employer groups are fighting the decision.132 International Franchise Association 
(IFA) President Steve Caldera has said that “[t]he Board’s tortured analysis will 
undoubtedly be met with skepticism and will be rejected by local franchise owners, 
legislators and, ultimately, the courts.”133  Caldera said, “[t]he IFA believes that by 
forcing major employers to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to establishing 
 
 126.  Id. at 21 (“First, no bargaining table is big enough to seat all of the entities that will be potential joint 
employers under the majority’s new standards. In this regard, we believe the majority’s new test impermissibly 
exceeds our statutory authority.”). 
 127.  Id. at 36.  
 128.  Id. at 45.  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. at 46. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See generally Caroline B. Galiatsos, Note, Beyond Joint Employer Status: A New Analysis for Employers’ 
Unfair Labor Practice Liability Under the NLRA, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 2087 (2015). 
 133.  Carl Horowitz, NLRB Rules in Favor of Teamsters in ‘Joint Employer’ Case, NAT’L LEGAL AND POL’Y CTR. 
 (Sept. 2, 2015), http://nlpc.org/stories/2015/09/02/nlrb-rules-favor-teamsters-joint-employer-case. 
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workplace standards, franchisees lose flexibility.”134  Jania Bailey, an IFA board 
member, responded to the decision, stating that “[i]f this goes into effect then the 
franchisor has to step in and have a standard for hiring, human resources, payroll, 
everything. It basically nullifies this independent business model.”135  Similarly, 
Beth Milito, Senior Legal Counsel for the National Federation for Independent 
Business, stated that, “thousands of Americans make a living as subcontractors, and 
this is a direct threat to them . . . .  They want the independence [of] being their 
own boss and . . . [the growth potential] . . . that [is lost] if there are no longer any 
regulatory or financial advantages in hiring subcontractors.”136  
Other recent decisions by the NLRB also demonstrate how the expansive 
interpretation of the right to control not only threatens technological innovation, 
but also risks destroying entire industries.137 Ultimately, if the NLRB and other 
adjudicators follow the majority’s reasoning, the new test could be the death knell 
for future entrepreneurship.   
III: HOW ARE GIG COMPANIES CHARACTERIZED? 
A.  Do Gig Companies Have an Employment Relationship with Entrepreneurs? 
Many gig companies contend that they are exempt from providing various benefits 
under law because their business relationships are merely licensor-licensee 
relationships.138  Nevertheless, many courts appear to be unpersuaded by this 
argument and have found that at least some form of employment relationship 
exists.139 In doing so, judges have then been left to determine whether the 
entrepreneur’s services sufficiently constitute the work of an independent 
contractor or an employee. 
Some courts have interpreted gig company policies as constituting sufficient 
employer control over an employee.140  These policies include business or 
operational features that most gig companies use, such as requiring the 
entrepreneur to provide on-demand service and display the company’s trademark 
 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id.   
 137.  See, e.g., Miller & Anderson, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 7 (2016); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. et al., 
Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 45–46 (2015) (Miscimarra and Johnson, JJ., dissenting). 
 138.  See, e.g., Cotter, et al. v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Berwick v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 11-46739EK, 2015 WL 
4153765, at *4 (Cal. Labor Comm’r June 3, 2015); see Rasier LLC v. Florida, NO. 0026 2834 68-02, 7–9, 11, 14 
(Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity Dec. 3, 2015) (final determination). 
 139.  See, e.g., Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078; O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142; Berwick, No. 11-46739EK, at 
*6. 
 140.  See, e.g., O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142; see also Wittenstein v. Fugazy Cont’l Corp., 59 A.D.2d 249, 
250–51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
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when working, using a consumer ranking system as a quality control mechanism 
for monitoring their performance, and collecting payment directly from 
consumers.141 
Many gig companies have faced worker classification lawsuits. These have 
included those providing transportation services like Uber142 and Lyft,143 as well as 
companies offering such services as grocery delivery -Instacart,144 couriers -
Postmates145 and Shyp,146 restaurant food delivery -Caviar,147 laundry and dry-
cleaning -Washio,148 house cleaning and home repair -Homejoy149 and Handyman.150 
Moreover, courts have also rejected the argument that gig companies are 
essentially personnel staffing agencies.151  In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 
Judge Edward Chen explained: 
Uber not only unilaterally qualifies and selects its drivers, it maintains an 
ongoing relationship and exercises supervision over their performance. 
Uber’s success depends upon the quality of its drivers’ ongoing performance.  
In contrast, recruiters engage in a one-time transaction and do not 
supervise the clients it places; nor does the recruiter’s income depend on the 
ongoing performance of those clients.152 
Not taking on the risk of noncompliance, some gig companies have voluntarily 
classified their relationships with workers as employer-employee relationships.153  
 
 141.  See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 984–90 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 142.  See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *29–30 n. 6 
(identifying 15 cases dealing with worker classification). 
 143.  See, e.g., Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078; Loewen v. Lyft, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 945, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 144.  See, e.g., Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, 
Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 930, 934 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 145.  See, e.g., Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Singer, et al. v. Postmates, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-01284 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). 
 146.  See, e.g., Amended Class Action Arbitration Demand at 1, Tang v. Shyp, Inc. (Am. Arb. Ass. July 7, 
2015) [hereinafter Tang Amended Class Action Arbitration Demand]. 
 147.  See, e.g., Levin v. Caviar, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1149–50 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 148.  See, e.g., Taranto v. Washio, Inc., 9845 No. CGC 15-546584, 2015 Cal. Super. LEXIS, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
2015). 
 149.  See, e.g., Iglesias v. Homejoy, Inc., No. 15-CV-01286-EMC, 2015 WL 5698741, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
29, 2015). 
 150.  See, e.g., Zenelaj v. Handybook, 82 F. Supp. 3d 968, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 151.  See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Conner v. Uber Techs. Inc, 
82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 152.  O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 n.13. 
 153.  Rebecca Smith & Judy Conti, Candidates: How Will You Turn ‘Gig’ Jobs Into Good Jobs?, THE HILL 
(Mar. 22, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/labor/273789-candidates-how-will-you-turn-
gig-jobs-into-good-jobs. 
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Others, such as Homejoy, dissolved their companies because they were unable to 
pay mounting litigation costs incurred from responding to worker misclassification 
lawsuits.154  Still others have agreed to multi-million dollar settlements to avoid the 
risks of a negative legal determination.155   
B.  Gig Companies Are Subject to Vicarious Liability for Entrepreneurs and Other 
Legal Claims Regarding Their Business Practices  
As demonstrated below, gig companies are not immune from the litigation risks 
that other employers or corporate entities face.  Courts have held gig companies 
liable for both the acts of their entrepreneurs and for their business practices.156  
Specifically, workers, consumers, and state governments have all pursued litigation 
against gig companies for tortious injuries, contractual violation, fraudulent market 
practices, non-compliance with industry regulations, and other statutory 
requirements.157  
Consumers and other third-parties have sued gig companies for injurious torts 
caused by entrepreneurs.158  In doing so, these plaintiffs attempt to hold gig 
companies strictly liable for their products and negligence.159  Under the negligence 
theory, gig companies “have a duty to take reasonable care to guarantee the proper 
hiring, training, and supervision” of their workers, “regardless of whether an 
employment relationship exists.”160  As a result, gig companies may be liable for 
negligent misrepresentations regarding the competence of their workers.  For 
example, California has sued Uber, alleging that the gig company misrepresented 
the fitness of the drivers on its ride-sharing platform.161   
Gig companies also have been sued for breach of contract, fraud, and violations 
of civil regulations.  Some courts have struck contractual clauses in gig companies’ 
arbitration agreements with entrepreneurs, refusing to enforce clauses on 
 
 154.  Iglesias v. Homejoy, Inc., No. 15-CV-01286-EMC, 2015 WL 5698741, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 155.  See generally, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Shepard v. 
Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No 12-CV-03893-JSW (N.D. Cal. filed May 23, 2014) (moving for approval of Lowe’s $6.5 
Million settlement for misclassification). 
 156.  Complaint for Damages and Demand for Trial by Jury at 4, Liu v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. CGC-14-
536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 2014). 
 157.  See supra Part III.A; Cotter, et al. v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. 
Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Berwick v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 11-46739EK, 
2015 WL 4153765, at *1 (Cal. Labor Comm’r June 3, 2015). 
 158.  Complaint for Damages and Demand for Trial by Jury at 4, Liu v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. CGC-14-
536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 2014).  
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Macmurdo, supra note 78, at 341. 
 161.  Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalties, Restitution and other Equitable Relief at 5, 
People v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-543120 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 9, 2014). 
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arbitration venue, fee-sharing, and fee-splitting, deeming them to be 
unconscionable.162   
Other courts have permitted lawsuits against gig companies for statutory 
violations stemming from their business operations.  For example, Shyp, a full-
service shipping gig company, faced suit for civil penalties under California’s 
Private Attorneys General Act.163  Also, Postmates has been sued for violating the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to comply with consumer report disclosure and 
notice requirements when deciding whether an entrepreneur can perform courier 
services for customers.164 
Some gig companies have also been subject to various regulatory requirements 
for their business industries.  For instance, transportation-based gig companies in 
California must comply with California’s Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) 
regulations for businesses that transport passengers on California public 
highways.165  The CPUC rejected the argument that Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar gig 
companies were “just an app.”166  Instead, those companies now bear the onus in 
ensuring that their driver-entrepreneurs satisfy insurance and vehicle maintenance 
requirements.167 
Furthermore, some courts have rejected gig companies’ attempts to quash state 
and municipal legislation intended to grant workers labor rights.  In 2016, United 
States District Court Judge Robert Lasnik dismissed the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s lawsuit, filed on behalf of transportation gig companies, Uber and 
Eastside for Hire, Inc., against Seattle, alleging that the City’s ordinance giving 
drivers the right to unionize for collective bargaining purposes violates and is 
preempted by federal antitrust law (Sherman Act), is preempted by the NLRA, and 
violates the Washington Consumer Protection Act and the Washington Public 
Records Act.168  Judge Lasnik dismissed the lawsuit, arguing that the Chamber and 
gig company members lacked the requisite standing because the ordinance had not 
harmed them.169  Judge Lasnik stated, “[n]either of the Chambers’ members has 
 
 162.  See Vargas v. Delivery Outsourcing, LLC, No. 15-cv-03408-JST, at 20 (N.D. Cal Mar. 14, 2016) 
(severing the choice of law and forum selection clauses from the arbitration provision, and enforcing the rest of 
the arbitration provision). 
 163.  Tang Amended Class Action Arbitration Demand, supra note 146. 
 164.  First Amended Class Action Complaint, Nesbitt v. Postmates, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-04052-VC (N.D. Cal. 
filed Sept. 24, 2015). 
 165.  Macmurdo, supra note 78, at 315. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 319, 322–23. 
 168.  Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Chamber of Com. of the United States v. Seattle, 
No. C16-0322RSL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2016). 
 169.  Id. at 7. 
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suffered an injury that is traceable to the Ordinance and would be redressed if the 
Ordinance were declared invalid or enforcement were otherwise enjoined.”170   
IV. THE FRANCHISE BUSINESS MODEL 
A.  Franchising Is About Brand Control 
Franchising is a contractual relationship between two independent business entities, 
the licensor of the franchise brand (franchisor), and the licensee (franchisee).171  In 
exchange for using the franchisor’s trade name and system for operating the 
business—i.e. a method of providing services to customers—the franchisee pays a 
franchise fee and agrees to adhere to certain quality controls.172  These controls help 
to protect the franchise brand assets: trademark, trade names, and good will.173  The 
franchisee is responsible for the daily management of its independently owned 
business.174  Furthermore, the franchisee’s profits and losses are based solely on its 
own performance and capabilities.175 
Franchising enables an entrepreneur to go into business for himself without 
having to face several of the risks associated with other start-ups.176  The disclosure 
requirements discussed infra are one reason for this.177  
On the consumer end, the consumer chooses the franchisee’s services instead of 
another competitor because he prefers the quality of the franchisor’s brand and 
expects that the franchisee’s services will meet that brand standard.178 
 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  What is a Franchise, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, http://www.franchise.org/what-is-a-franchise (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2017) (“In a business format franchise relationship[,] the franchisor provides to the franchisee not just 
its trade name, products and services, but an entire system for operating the business.”). 
 172.  Id. (“Franchising is simply a method for expanding a business and distributing goods and services 
through a licensing relationship. In franchising, franchisors (a person or company that grants the license to a 
third party for the conducting of a business under their marks) not only specify the products and services that 
will be offered by the franchisees (a person or company who is granted the license to do business under the 
trademark and trade name by the franchisor), but also provide them with an operating system, brand and 
support.”).  
 173.  Id. (“At its core, franchising is about the franchisor’s brand value, how the franchisor supports its 
franchisees, how the franchisee meets its obligations to deliver the products and services to the system’s brand 
standards and most importantly – franchising is about the relationship that the franchisor has with its 
franchisees.”).  
 174.  Id. (“In a franchise system, the owner of the brand does not manage and operate the locations that 
serve consumers their products and services on a day-to-day basis.”).   
 175.  Id. (“Serving the consumer is the role and responsibility of the franchisee.”). 
 176.  Id. (“Franchising is a contractual relationship between a licensor (franchisor) and a licensee 
(franchisee) that allows the business owner to use the licensor’s brand and method of doing business to 
distribute products or services to consumers.”).  
 177.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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B.  Franchise Law 
Franchises are regulated entities, subject to state and federal franchising laws.  
Franchising laws cover (1) disclosure/registration requirements,179 and (2) standards 
governing the relationship between franchisor and franchisee.180  These laws involve 
an array of legal issues that arise during the franchise agreement, including: 
contractual provisions regarding performance obligations and termination 
restrictions,181 the use of the franchisor’s intellectual property,182 market competition 
and unfair trade practices,183 labor laws,184 and tort liability.185  
1.  Franchise Disclosure/Registration Requirements 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces various disclosure requirements for 
franchises along with some states that impose additional disclosure and registration 
requirements.186 The FTC defines a “franchise” as a business entity exhibiting three 
qualities: (1) Trademark, (2) Significant Control or Assistance, and (3) Franchisee 
Fee.187  To satisfy the Trademark requirement, the franchisor must license to the 
 
 178.  INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, supra note 171 (“A franchisor’s brand is its most valuable asset and consumers 
decide which business to shop at and how often to frequent that business based on what they know, or think 
they know, about the brand.  To a certain extent consumers really don’t care who owns the business so long as 
their brand expectations are met.”). 
 179.  Honey V. Gandhi, Franchising in the United States, 20 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 3, 7 (2014). 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 22–23. 
 182.  Id. at 13–16. 
 183.  Id. at 16–19. 
 184.  Id. at 19–22. 
 185.  Gandhi, supra note 179, at 19–22. 
 186.  Id. at 7. 
 187.  FTC Franchise Rule, Definitions, 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(h) (2016).  This rule explains that: 
Franchise means any continuing commercial relationship or arrangement where the franchisor 
promises that (1) The franchisee will obtain the right to operate a business that is identified or 
associated with the franchisor’s trademark, or to offer, sell, or distribute goods, services, or 
commodities that are identified or associated with the franchisor’s trademark; (2) The franchisor 
will exert or has authority to exert a significant degree of control over the franchisee’s method of 
operation, or provide significant assistance in the franchisee’s method of operation; and (3) As a 
condition of obtaining or commencing operation of the franchise, the franchisee makes a required 
payment or commits to make a required payment to the franchisor or its affiliate. 
Id. Andre Jaglom explains how many states may amend their franchise laws by adopting the new 2008 Franchise 
Registration and Disclosure Guidelines: 
Although it is expected that all franchise filing states will eventually adopt the 2008 Guidelines (in 
some cases with individual state modifications), only Maryland and Wisconsin have expressly done 
so. Several other states, including Minnesota, New York and North Dakota, have provided links to 
the 2008 Guidelines on their official websites, implicitly adopting them. 
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franchisee “the right to distribute goods and services that bear the franchisor’s 
trademark, service mark, trade name, logo, or other commercial symbol.”188  To 
meet the Significant Control or Assistance requirement, the franchisor must exert 
“significant control of, or provide[] significant assistance to the franchisee’s method 
of operation.”189  For the Franchisee Fee requirement, the franchisee must pay the 
franchisor at least $500 within the first six months of operations.190  Under the FTC 
Rule and under many state laws, payment constituting a franchise fee is very broad 
and “can include rent, required advertising payments, payments for initial 
equipment or inventory, fees for training seminars or security deposits, or a fee to 
keep the territory exclusive.”191 
Under the Amended FTC Franchise Rule, the franchisor must furnish the 
franchisee with the Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD) that has information in 
twenty-three categories regarding the franchised business, its operations, financial 
representation, and other pertinent information on franchisee ownership.192  The 
franchisor must provide the FDD fourteen days before the franchisee signs the 
franchise agreement or pays any consideration.193  Furthermore, the franchisor must 
make supplemental disclosures if there have been any material changes in the 
information provided in the FDD.194  Federal law does not require franchisors to file 
the FDD with the FTC, however some states do require that the Disclosure 
Document be filed with the respective state agency.195  
2.  Franchise Relationship Laws 
States are the primary source for laws governing the franchise relationship.  
Tantamount to these relationships are those laws regulating performance 
obligations and termination restrictions.  Franchisees are required to perform 
certain duties, as stipulated in the FDD and the franchise agreement regarding the 
franchise elements.  Additionally, courts recognize that “franchisors have the ability 
to enact changes and adjustments to many aspects of the franchise system and its 
policies” to ensure the long-term success of the franchise brand.196  These system-
 
Andre R. Jaglom, The Broad Scope of Franchise Laws: Traps for the Distribution Contract Dealer, SW041 ALI-CLE 
1, 2 n.8 (2014). 
 188.  U.S. Franchise Law Basics, VINSON FRANCHISE LAW FIRM, http://franchiselaw.net/startups/ 
usfranchiselawbasics.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Jaglom, supra note 187, at 2. 
 192.  Id. at 3.   
 193.  Id. at 17.   
 194.  Gandhi, supra note 179, at 8–9. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Leonard H. MacPhee, Recent Franchise Cases and the Importance of Clear and Complete FDDS and 
Franchise Agreement, ASPATORE 1, 10, 2013 WL 3773412 (June 1, 2013) (noting that franchisors have the 
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wide changes include “couponing and discounting, advertising and marketing fund 
payments, [changes to] prices” and products offered, “upgrades to the retail 
location and equipment,” software changes, and other aspects of the franchise 
brand.197 
Most disputes stem from franchisees’ refusal to comply with adjustments to the 
franchise system.  Typically, franchisees challenge the franchisor’s ability to enact 
these changes and enforce compliance by claiming that a new performance 
requirement is unnecessary for preserving the brand standard.198  Most courts 
decide whether performance obligation is part of the brand standard based on the 
language in the franchise agreement.199  Many franchisors have been successful in 
implementing these changes by including in the franchise agreement general 
contractual provisions whereby the franchisee agrees to accept and comply with 
changes the franchisor in good faith believes are necessary and desirable for the 
franchise.200 
Franchisors may terminate franchisees that do not meet performance 
obligations, including failing to pay the franchise fee or not complying with the 
franchise service standards.201  Most states regulate franchise termination 
provisions.202 In many instances, states require that a franchisor must first provide 
the franchisee with “notice” of non-compliance and an opportunity to “cure” 
defective performance before terminating a franchisee for “good cause.”203   
3.  Franchisor Liability 
Franchisors are not liable for all of their franchisees’ tortious conduct or labor law 
violations.  In many instances, the ultimate determination typically depends on the 
degree of control the franchisor exerts over the franchisee’s operations. 
In the context of tort liability, a franchisor may be “vicariously liable to third 
parties for the negligence or other misconduct of its franchisees” when the 
franchisor “has effective control over the operations of its franchisee.”204  
Additionally, a franchisor could be “liable for the conduct of a franchisee that is 
 
authority to make changes and adjustments to franchise system and its policies); Gandhi, supra note 179, at 11 
(explaining that the definition of a franchise entails that the franchisor grants the franchisee the authority to sell 
their goods under the franchisor’s marketing plan).  
 197.  MacPhee, supra note 196, at 1. 
 198.  Gandhi, supra note 179, at 18 (citing Burda v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 (S.D. Ohio 
2009)). 
 199.  See MacPhee, supra note 196, at 13 (noting that “[c]ourts will look to the [contract] preamble in 
connection with interpreting the rights and obligations the parties assumed in connection with that contract”). 
 200.  Id. at 3. 
 201.  Gandhi, supra note 179, at 22. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Jaglom, supra note 187, at 7.  
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either required by the franchisor or represented as part of the franchisor’s 
operations.”205  However, a franchisor is not subject to liability if “the franchisor 
does not have control over the pertinent injury-causing day-to-day activities of the 
franchisee.”206 
With regard to labor law claims, because the franchisee hires workers to operate 
his establishment and makes managerial decisions affecting employment, the 
franchisee and not the franchisor is responsible for ensuring compliance with labor 
laws.  Therefore, workers alleging labor law violations sue the franchisee that 
employs them.  For example, several Merry Maids franchisees have been sued both 
by their cleaning service workers and government agencies for an array of labor law 
violations—pregnancy and disability discrimination, workers’ compensation, and 
unfair labor practices.207  In those cases, the suits were limited to the specific 
franchisee that engaged in the unlawful conduct.208   
Franchisee workers have attempted to hold franchisors liable for labor law 
violations based on the joint-employer theory.209  Despite this, the basis for finding 
the employee-employer relationship in franchising has been overwhelmingly rooted 
in whether the franchisor has exercised control over the franchisee workers beyond 
what was necessary for protecting the franchisor’s brand assets.210  Some franchisor-
friendly states have enacted statutes that prohibit holding franchisors liable under 
the joint employer theory altogether.211   
4.  Franchisees are not Presumptive Employees 
Franchisees are generally presumed to be independent contractors for the purpose 
of employee status determinations.212  By way of example, a federal district court in 
 
 205.  Id.  
 206.  Id.  
 207.  See generally Tentative Ruling, Cruz v. Merry Maids of Fresno, No. 11CECG01156, 2015 WL 4714377 
(Cal. Super. July 13, 2015). 
 208.  NLRB v. Le Fort Enters., Inc., 791 F.3d 207, 210 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding that Merry Maids franchisee 
required collective bargaining rights for the twenty-nine employees working for it); Tentative Ruling, Cruz v. 
Merry Maids of Fresno, 2015 WL 4714377, at *2 (Cal. Super. July 13, 2015) (granting summary judgment to 
franchisor Merry Maids in cleaning workers’ misclassification lawsuit); EEOC v. V&B LLC, No. 14-cv-393 
(Sept. 15, 2015) (settling a pregnancy and disability discrimination suit against Merry Maids franchisee). 
 209.  See Patterson v. Dominos LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 726 (Cal. 2013) (holding that franchisor was not liable 
for sexual harassment claim bought by franchisee worker); Vandemark v. McDonald’s Corp., 904 A.2d 627, 633, 
636 (N.H. 2006) (holding that a franchisor was not liable for franchisee’s security measures). 
 210.  See generally, e.g., Vandemark, 904 A.2d at 627 (holding that the franchisor was not liable for 
franchisee’s security measures). 
 211.  Andrea Wells, New Look in Franchise Liability, INS. J. (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/coverstory/2016/01/11/394052.htm (“Some states, including 
Michigan, Texas, Tennessee[,] and Louisiana, have already passed legislation aimed at protecting franchisors 
from being considered a joint employer with their franchisees.  Virginia and Wisconsin may also follow suit.”). 
 212.  Gandhi, supra note 179, at 19. 
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Juarez v. Jani-King of California, Inc. held that if the relationship is defined by a 
franchise agreement—the entrepreneur-franchisee carries the initial burden of 
establishing that the franchisor exercised control beyond that necessary to protect 
and maintain its interest in its trademark, trade name, and goodwill.213   
In Juarez, the court found that the entrepreneur-franchisee for a cleaning service 
franchise failed to overcome its burden of proof.214 As a part of the franchise 
agreement, Jani-King’s franchisees were required to follow specific cleaning 
methods and handle customer complaints a certain way.215  Franchisees had to wear 
uniforms, use Jani–King’s name and phone number in client communication, and 
receive approval before they created marketing and advertising tools.216  
After finding that these controls were “policies required to protect Jani–King’s 
service mark and goodwill,” the court concluded that the entrepreneur-franchisee 
failed to provide sufficient “evidence tending to prove that an employer-employee 
relationship existed between Jani–King and its franchisees.”217  
V. THIRD-WAY FOR CLASSIFYING GIG WORKERS 
A.  Gig Jobs That Fit the Franchise Model 
Although they currently do not have to comply with the formal documentation 
requirements of franchise laws, many gig companies would likely fit within the 
franchise business mold seemlessly.  This section will examine two current gig 
companies and will explain how these companies would benefit from structuring 
their business as a franchise.  
1.  Uber Technologies 
Uber drivers are entrepreneurs who earn money by transporting passengers to a 
particular destination.218 Consumers have stated that they appreciate the ease and 
convenience of being able to book a ride using the app.219  Furthermore, consumers 
have also appreciated the affordable pricing and driver accountability that the 
 
 213.  Juarez v. Jani-King of California, Inc., 273 F.R.D. 571, 582 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. at 583. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Driver’s Requirements: How to Drive with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/requirements (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 219.  Max Chafkin, Admit it, You Love Uber, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 
3050762/tech-forecast/admit-it-you-love-uber. 
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service provides.220  These positive associations with the Uber brand benefit 
drivers.221   
Under the current policy, Uber drivers must use the Uber app to book rides with 
passengers, and while transporting them, must display the Uber trademark and 
conform to company service policies.222  The policies include keeping their vehicles 
clean and well-maintained, dressing appropriately, taking the best route, being nice 
to the passenger, picking up the passenger after accepting his ride request, opening 
the passenger’s door and offering to carry his bags, among other service standards.223  
To ensure drivers maintain Uber’s quality standards, Uber uses GPS tracking 
technology, a customer rating system, and in rare instances deactivates the accounts 
of non-compliant driver-entrepreneurs.224  
These company policies, using the Uber app for ride booking and payment, 
offering affordable prices, requiring that drivers display the Uber trademark in their 
vehicles and provide a consumer-friendly experience, are all policies of what could 
be an Uber franchise.225  Treating drivers as franchisees fits seemlessly within the 
current Uber model.  Uber would not be required to own a fleet of vehicles as 
drivers would still be responsible for providing their own cars, retaining insurance, 
and paying for their business expenses.  Additionally, rather than starting their own 
transportation companies from the ground-up, driver-entrepreneurs would benefit 
from using Uber’s intellectual property and business service model for transporting 
passengers.226 
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Furthermore, Uber would likely not have to change its revenue model as driver-
entrepreneurs could still pay Uber a 20% to 30% commission for each passenger 
ride.227  Collectively, these commission payments could still be required in a 
franchise agreement and could also serve as the franchise fee.228   
In addition, Uber’s driver-deactivation process, which is based on its customer 
rating system, could also fit within franchise termination requirements, mandating 
that franchisors provide franchisees “notice” and allow a “cure period” before 
terminating the franchisee “for cause.”  Uber deactivates accounts of driver-
entrepreneurs who have consistently failed to comply with the Uber’s service 
polices.229  Drivers who routinely receive poor customer ratings for any reason 
including—choosing a “bad route,” “disrespecting” the passenger, unsafe driving, 
having an unkempt car, or talking on the phone while driving—would satisfy the 
termination for “good cause” requirement.230  Furthermore, Uber already satisfies 
the “notice” requirement by sending weekly emails to driver-entrepreneurs about 
their ratings, noting when those ratings fall below the service standard, and 
detailing the specific customer criticisms that led to their poor ratings.231  Uber also 
already satisfies the “cure” opportunity requirement by giving driver-entrepreneurs 
a period to improve performance and also provides concrete suggestions for 
increasing their ratings, thus ensuring compliance with Uber’s customer service 
policies.232   
Clearly, many of Uber’s company service policies and current mechanisms for 
ensuring quality control already align with the franchise business model. 
2.  TaskRabbit 
The franchise model could also be applied to TaskRabbit, where the TaskRabbit 
company is the franchisor and the Tasker-entrepreneur is the franchisee.   
Consumers choose Tasker-entrepreneurs to perform tasks over business 
competitors because of the TaskRabbit service brand.  The TaskRabbit brand 
guarantees a consumer experience that includes: on-demand task service, 
convenient task booking and payment using the TaskRabbit app, quality task 
performance at an affordable price, better Tasker selection through a customer 
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rating system, and trust that the Tasker who appears at the consumer’s door in a 
TaskRabbit uniform will provide safe and reliable task service.233 
Accordingly, the Tasker-entrepreneur, who uses the TaskRabbit app to book task 
work, benefits from using TaskRabbit’s brand assets-its name, intellectual property, 
and reputation.  Additionally, contrary to competitive businesses, TaskRabbit does 
not set a time limit or minimum number of tasks that the Tasker-entrepreneur 
must complete to continue using the internet-platform.234  Instead, Taskers enjoy 
substantial autonomy by deciding which tasks to accept, the duration for 
completing the task, and the instruments needed for performing the task.235 
TaskRabbit exercises quality controls over the Tasker-entrepreneurs to the extent 
necessary to protect the company’s brand assets.236  Although Tasker-entrepreneurs 
must wear a uniform while performing a contracted task, the uniform requirement 
is no different than that proscribing what McDonald’s workers must wear while on 
duty.237  The Tasker’s uniform could easily be described as a hallmark of the 
TaskRabbit service brand because the uniform both displays the TaskRabbit 
trademark and the uniform policy distinguishes the Tasker-entrepreneur from 
competitors. 238  Additionally, like Uber, TaskRabbit uses a customer rating system 
as a disciplinary mechanism to maintain the TaskRabbit service brand.239  Although 
Tasker-entrepreneurs do not risk deactivation, those who fail to satisfy company 
service standards by receiving poor customer ratings appear lower on the list of 
Taskers used by consumers to make a selection.240 
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The TaskRabbit revenue model, in which TaskRabbit takes 30% commission of 
the total price paid for the task performed,241 could also be maintained through the 
franchise agreement.   For example, the franchise agreement could stipulate that 
TaskRabbit receive 30% commission on all gross proceeds from the entrepreneurs 
task services.  Therefore, if a Tasker-entrepreneur earns $50, for a short, one-hour 
task, then TaskRabbit would collect $15.242  However, for a longer task, such as 
moving furniture that could take four hours to complete, a Tasker-entrepreneur 
may earn anywhere from $240 to $600, and TaskRabbit would collect a service fee 
commission of $72 to $180.   
B.  Adjudicating Employment Misclassification Claims for Gig Companies Using the 
Franchise Model 
As has been demonstrated through the specific examples outlined above, if gig 
companies adopted a franchise model, the gig economy would remain largely 
unaffected.  Gig companies could continue to perform their matching function with 
little interruption or change in their revenue streams.  Entrepreneurs and 
consumers could continue to engage in the service transactions as they currently do.   
The only difference between a franchise gig regime and the current gig regime is 
that gig company-franchisors would be shielded from certain labor claims.   
1.  The Gig Company-Franchisor 
Those companies that adopt a franchise business model would need to comply with 
state and federal franchise laws mandating certain disclosure/registration 
requirements and governing the franchise relationship.243  Although gig companies 
must wait fourteen days before the franchise relationship can be established,244 this 
is hardly enough time to bring operations to a stand still.   
Furthermore, in many states, gig company-franchisors would benefit from the 
favorable legal presumption that their entrepreneur-franchisee is an independent 
contractor.245  Many of the gig companies’ operational and consumer service 
requirements that courts have viewed as evidence that the entrepreneur is an 
employee, such as the gig company taking disciplinary actions based on customer 
rankings and requiring entrepreneurs to provide on-demand service to consumers, 
are more likely to be construed as performance obligations and termination 
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provisions, typical of all franchise agreements.  Additionally, given that franchises 
are highly regulated entities, courts are less likely to perceive gig companies as a 
regulatory avoider attempting to misclassify entrepreneurs in order to subvert labor 
law requirements. 
In the long-run, the additional costs gig companies would pay toward franchise 
regulatory fees may prove a mere pittance when the alternative could mean paying 
millions in back-pay to workers for labor law violations.246  
2.  The Entrepreneur-Franchisee 
With regard to their day-to-day operations, entrepreneur-franchisees would largely 
remain unaffected by the shift toward a franchise model as they would still be able 
to provide the same on-demand work to consumers in accordance with the gig 
company’s service and commission policies.  
In addition, even though franchisees do not enjoy the same legal protections as 
employees, the expansive franchise laws and disclosure requirements still provide 
significant protection for franchisees. While the employee presumption may no 
longer fall in their favor, they are certainly not enjoined from bringing forth labor 
claims.247  As has been explained, in these inquiries, the judge would have to 
evaluate whether the entrepreneur-franchisee sufficiently established that the 
franchisor required the entrepreneur to comply with additional performance 
conditions beyond what is necessary for maintaining the franchise brand.248  While 
this burden has shifted, it certainly is not impossible to overcome.249   
CONCLUSION 
Although their reception has not been universally positive, the growth of Internet 
based gig companies has allowed a great deal of entrepreneurs to go into business 
for themselves.  Much like the impermanent and flexible nature of gigs in the music 
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industry, the gig economy has provided a much desired flexibility to both 
businesses and workers.  
Despite its growing prevalence, it seems the law has not kept up with the 
innovation that moves the gig economy. Courts and policymakers have thus far 
been reluctant to distinguish these newer gig companies from more traditional 
employment models.  As a result, these gig companies are subject to the same 
tortious liability, consumer protection regulations, and labor laws as any other 
employer would be.  This has left courts applying traditional worker classifications 
to a new and growing type of labor force that does not necessarily fit within the 
traditional mold.  Given the recent trend in the law, courts will likely continue to 
favor interpretations finding an employer-employee relationship in many 
circumstances to the detriment of gig companies.   
For this reason, to better address their needs going forward and protect 
themselves from certain litigation risks, gig companies should consider adopting a 
franchise model and seek to convert their existing “licensees” to franchisees.  Even 
though franchises are heavily regulated, a franchise model would likely be the best 
option for gig companies seeking to maintain an element of brand control while 
also seeking to be shielded from liability and other operational costs. 
